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Abstract:  
This paper explores the response of the divorce rate to law reform introducing unilateral divorce 
after controlling for law reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce, which are omitted from 
most previous works. We introduce two main policy changes that have swept the U.S. since the 
late 1970s; the approval of the joint custody regime and the Child Support Enforcement 
program. Because those reforms affect divorce decisions by counteracting the reallocation of 
property rights generated by the unilateral divorce procedure and by increasing the expected 
financial costs of divorce, it is arguable that their omission might obscure the impact of 
unilateral divorce reforms on divorce rates. Our results suggest that what has driven the decline 
in the divorce rate since the 1980s are law reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce rather 
than a reverse response of divorce rates to the adoption of unilateral divorce laws. Supplemental 
analysis, developed to examine the frequency of permanent shocks in U.S. divorce rates, 
indicates that the positive permanent changes in divorce rates can be associated with the 
implementation of unilateral divorce, and that the negative permanent changes can be related to 
the law reforms concerning living arrangement in aftermath of divorce. This seems to confirm 
the important role of those policies in the evolution of divorce rates. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In an article in the American Economic Review, Justin Wolfers (2006) finds that reforms 
concerning divorce law in the U.S.A. that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s had a transitory 
effect on divorce rates. Specifically, he claims that, after a decade, no effect on divorce rate 
could be discerned as a result of the implementation of no-fault unilateral divorce. Further, some 
of his estimates indicate that divorce rate declined 15 years after the reform. Even though the 
empirical evidence of an effect on divorce rate does not confirm the predictions of Coasian 
bargaining, Wolfers suggests that these findings can be considered as consistent with the 
Coasian assumption of efficient bargaining.1 He argues that the small change observed in the 
divorce rate may indicate that, in most of the cases, couples are able to bargain efficiently even 
under unilateral divorce.  
A potential concern with the analysis developed by Wolfers is that it omits reforms that 
introduced changes in divorce settlements.2 There are two primary aspects of law relevant to 
divorce and both may affect divorce decisions (Fine and Fine 1994). First, there are laws that 
regulate how spouses obtain a divorce, and these include those reforms analyzed by Wolfers 
(2006). Second, there are laws that govern the living arrangements in the subsequent periods 
after divorce, including such matters as spousal support, child support, and child custody, those 
are not studied by Wolfers but they may have significance in the evolution of the divorce rate.3 
Although, from a theoretical point of view, it can be suggested that those changes in divorce 
settlements have an ambiguous effect on divorce (see Nixon, 1997; Rasul, 2006; and Halla, 
2009), previous empirical research found that both changes in the financial obligation of parents 
and the introduction of joint custody negatively affect divorce rate (see Nixon, 1997; and Brinig 
and Buckley, 1998).4 Thus, it is arguable that the analysis of one of those aspects of law relevant 
to divorce alone might in some way obscure the impact of unilateral reforms on divorce rates. 
In the U.S.A., while the share of population covered by the no-fault unilateral reforms already 
analyzed by Wolfers (2006) increased from the late 1960s, achieving 50 percent of the 
population in the early 1970s, see Figure 1, a trend of reforms occurred in the area of post-
divorce child custody and child support. Empirically, it is unclear whether the dummy variables 
included by Wolfers (2006) to capture the dynamic response of divorce are only picking up the 
                                                 
1 In Coasian terms, a change in divorce law only generates a redistribution of the property rights between spouses, 
thus divorce reforms are not expected to affect the divorce rate (Becker 1981). 
2 Previous research on the effect of divorce law reforms on divorce rates also failed to account for changes in the 
aftermath of divorce, see Peters (1986, 1992), Allen (1992), Friedberg (1998), Gray (1998), and González and 
Viitanen (2009)  among others. 
3 We do not pay attention to changes in spousal support or alimony (a court-ordered money transfer between ex-
spouses for a limit period after the divorce) since only a small fraction of ex-spouses received alimony and in the 
period considered there were no significant changes in this issue (Beller and Graham 2003). 
4 More recently some studies do not find a significant effect of changes in custody laws and child support on the 
divorce rate (Halla 2009, and Heim 2003). 
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path of the adjustment of divorce rates to unilateral divorce. Wolfers observes that the effect of 
the unilateral divorce law reform on divorce rates had dissipated a decade after the 
implementation of the unilateral divorce, which coincides with the rise in the incidence of joint 
custody, see Figure 1. The timing of both reforms differs by at least a decade in almost all states 
in which those reforms were implemented (Friedberg 1998, and Leo 2008). In the area of child 
support, the U.S. Congress approved several laws to try to ensure child support payments. The 
main reforms were the Child Support Amendments of 1984, the Family Support Act of 1988, 
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 and the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act in 1998 (see Sorensen 
and Halpern (1999) for a review of state statutes) again tallying with the time in which a 
negative response of divorce rates to divorce law reforms is found in Wolfers (2006). We argue 
that the analysis developed by Wolfers may be measuring the response of divorce rates to 
changes in divorce laws in addtition to or instead of the response of divorce rates to custody 
reforms and Child Support Enforcement efforts. 
Initially, we attempted to replicate Wolfers’ results using data on the divorce rate from 
1956 to 1988 but including the reforms that govern the aftermath of divorce. We introduce both 
child custody law reforms and Child Support Enforcement efforts into Wolfers’ analysis. Our 
results suggest that the long-run effect of divorce law reforms on divorce rate observed by 
Wolfers may be confounding both unilateral reforms and changes in the aftermath of divorce. 
We find evidence of a persistent impact of divorce laws on divorce rates, although these results 
are sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific trends. This is maintained even after considering a 
range of alternative specifications. 
As an additional check that the changes in the aftermath of divorce are driving Wolfers’ 
findings, we separate the analysis by group of divorcing couples with and without minors in 
order to check whether the behavior of the childless couples—the sub-population not affected 
by legal changes in the aftermath of divorce when they obtain a divorce—is driving our results 
instead of the reaction of couples with minors. This is a particularly strong test since custody 
reforms may have an impact on the number of married people (Halla 2009). However, we 
present additional evidence suggesting that the joint custody law and the reinforcement of child 
support predominantly affect the exit from marriages of couples with minors as opposed to 
changing the divorce pattern of childless couples. 
Finally, since even after adding the reforms on the custody laws and child support to the 
analysis it is unclear whether divorce law have persistent effect on divorce, we explore the 
frequency of persistent shocks in U.S. divorce rates by exploiting another technique, a time-
series analysis.5 We analyse three possible scenarios (for a review of the literature on structural 
                                                 
5 The time-series analysis is a technique that has been ignored in most previous work. As exception, we find the work 
of Marvell (1989) which was the first attempt to develop a complete time-series analysis of divorce rates across the 
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breaks, see Perron 2006). First, the divorce rate is stationary. In this scenario, the divorce rate is 
basically stable; after a shock, such as divorce law reform, short-run effects on the divorce rate 
would be observed, but in the long-run, the divorce rate should return to its equilibrium level. In 
the second scenario, divorce is stationary around a process that is subject to structural breaks. In 
this setting, occasional shocks may cause permanent changes in the equilibrium rate itself, but 
most shocks would only cause temporary movements of the divorce rate around the equilibrium 
level. The third scenario consists of the divorce rate exhibiting a unit root. In this case, all 
shocks would have permanent effects on the level of divorce. 
Our results also contribute to a growing literature that evaluates whether shocks have 
permanent effects on socio-economic variables. Using statistical techniques very similar to ours, 
studies have examined whether shocks have a permanent effect on the long-run level of most 
macroeconomic and financial aggregates: real gross national product (GNP), nominal GNP, 
unemployment rate, among others (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Perron, 1989; Zivot and Andrews, 
1992), on the import–GDP and export–GDP ratios (Ben-David and Papell, 1997), on the 
purchasing power parity (Papell, 1997; O’Connell, 1998; Murray and Papell, 2002; Papell, 
2002) and even on the evolution of city growth (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Bosker et al., 
2008). We add to this work by presenting empirical evidence of the frequency of permanent 
shocks in U.S. divorce rates. 
The clear result of the time-series analysis is that not all shocks have transitory effects 
on the divorce rate. This result is robust to a number of alternative tests. There is no single 
scenario to identify the behavior of the divorce rate; we find empirical evidence of stationarity 
around a process that is subject to structural breaks, where only a few occasional shocks have 
permanent effects, and of unit root, with all shocks having a permanent effect on the divorce 
rate. In addition, our result suggest that persistent positive changes can be associated in most of 
the cases with major changes in divorce laws and those permanent negative changes can be 
related to changes in custody laws and the Child Support Enforcement program, since the break 
dates and the dates of the reforms are quite close to each other. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the results of Wolfers (2006). In 
section III and section IV, we introduce custody law reform and Child Support Enforcement 
efforts, respectively, into Wolfers’ analysis. Section V includes the supplemental analysis of the 
frequency of permanent shocks in divorce and gives possible explanations for these changes, 
and Section VI concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
U.S., finding that the major impact on divorce rates of the change to no-fault laws is delayed for a year, or Ellman 
and Lohr (1998) who used an intervention analysis. For the case of Europe, we find the works of van Poppel and de 
Beer (1993) for the Netherlands, and Smith (1997) for Britain. In both cases, they observe evidence of permanent 
legal effects on divorce rates. 
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II. Replicating Wolfers 
 
As mentioned above, Wolfers (2006) tests the dynamic response of divorce rate to a change in 
the legal regime that governs how spouses divorce. To do that, Wolfers uses data on the divorce 
rate in each state ranging from 1956 to 1988, from Vital Statistics of the United States. The 
divorce rate is defined as the annual number of divorces per thousand inhabitants in each state. 
He claims that with this sample he is able to determine the dynamic response of divorce to 
changes in divorce laws that occurred in the U.S.A. from the late 1960s, once he identified the 
pre-existing state-specific trends. He estimates, [ ] tstsstssttssktskkts TimeStateFETimeStateFETimeFEStateFEUDDR ,2,,1, ·· εβ +Σ+Σ+Σ+Σ+Σ= ≥
 (1) 
where DRs,t is the divorce rate in state s in year t, the variable UDs,t,k is a dummy, sets equal to 
one when the state s has a unilateral divorce regime effective in year t for k periods. These 
dummy variables are supposed to capture the entire dynamic response of divorce to the new 
legal regime while the state-specific time trends identify pre-existing trends. 
Panel A of Table 1 simply replicates Wolfers’ results where equation (1) is estimated 
using population-weighted least squares. In the specification of column (1), which only includes 
state and year fixed effects, the dynamic estimates show that the positive effect on divorce rates 
following the adoption of unilateral divorce appears to fade over the subsequent decade. 
Coefficients then become negative and statistically significant, so the divorce rate declines as a 
result of the adoption of the unilateral divorce law. As Wolfers reflects, long-run estimates seem 
to be not quite robust; when more controls are added, the coefficients become less negative or 
even positive but statistically insignificant, see columns (2) and (3) which include state-specific 
time trends and quadratic state-specific time trends, respectively. All in all, Wolfers concludes 
that legal reforms that occurred in the U.S.A. have a transitory effect on the divorce rate.  
The dynamic response after a little more than a decade, certainly, seems at odds. It is 
difficult to establish a clear causal link between the liberalization of divorce law and the fall in 
divorce rates since the 1980s, correlation does not automatically imply causation. Dummy 
variables added by Wolfers to pick up the dynamic response of divorce may include not only 
the reaction of divorce rates to laws that regulate how to obtain a divorce, but also the response 
of those divorce rates to changes in laws that govern the aftermath of divorce, the 
implementation of a joint custody regime and the Child Support Enforcement efforts. 
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III. Joint Custody Regime 
Why does a reform in custody law matter in the analysis of divorce rates? The move from a sole 
custody regime to a setting with the possibility of joint custody may mean a backward step to a 
regime in which mutual consent is necessary. Under a sole-custody regime, women have 
traditionally been responsible for the child, whereas under a joint custody regime, decisions 
affecting the child must be jointly made by parents, requiring discussion and collaboration 
between them (Bartlett and Stack 1991).6 This necessity of cooperation and mutual consent in 
child custody may be counteracting the reassignment of property rights generated by the 
approval of the unilateral divorce regime.7 Although the unilateral regime transfers the right to 
divorce to the spouse most wanting a divorce, and as a consequence it is the party who wants to 
continue to be married who has to compensate the spouse who wishes to leave, under the joint 
custody regime the requirement of cooperation and mutual consent produces a change of 
direction of the compensation; it is the spouse who wants to divorce who has to compensate the 
other party to mutual consent in the custody of their child even if disparities in the value placed 
by the parties on custody exist. In fact, the greater the bargaining advantage given to the party 
who values the custody less highly, the more difficult the mutual consent will be (Bartlett and 
Stack 1991). 
In Coasian terms, both reforms consist of reassignments of property rights between 
spouses which should not affect divorce rate under assumptions of full transferability, perfect 
information and no transaction costs. However, what is observed by simply comparing the 
evolution of the divorce rate across states and the changes in laws related to divorce calls into 
question the applicability of the Coase theorem to marital dissolution. 
While between 1968 and 1977 28 states passed to a no-fault unilateral system, from 
1979 what swept the U.S.A. was the introduction of a joint custody regime (Folberg 1991). In 
                                                 
6 We do not discern here either between various forms of joint custody such as “joint legal custody” (both parents 
share the right and the obligation of making major decisions about their child’s upbringing in issues such as religion, 
health and education) and “joint physical custody” (the child spends a significant amount of time with each parent), 
nor between the way in which parents achieve joint custody (parental agreement or award by a judge). We consider 
any kind of joint custody statute approved in the period considered since any of these systems requires the 
involvement of both parents. 
7 We do not aim to study how gender disparities introduced by the new law reforms affect the evolution of the 
divorce rate. It is important to note that, although laws that regulate how to get a divorce are gender neutral; the 
traditional sole-custody regime could be distorting this neutrality by increasing the power of the custodian parent, 
normally the mother, creating a “winner/loser” situation (Folberg 1991). Under a sole-custody regime it is the man 
who has to compensate his spouse to stay married and to see their child if it is the woman who wants to divorce. 
When the party who wants to divorce is the man, he also has to compensate his wife to be able to stay with his child, 
and so, for men it is costly to get a divorce under both unilateral divorce and a sole-custody regime. The 
implementation of a joint-custody regime may correct this bias by increasing men’s rights. In this way, the expected 
utility of divorce increases for men, who traditionally had not been  responsible for the child, and decreases for 
women, see Elkin (1991). In this setting, it is the husband, if he wants to divorce, who does not have to compensate 
his wife for having his child with him and for his wife it is going to be more costly to stay married. On the other hand, 
if it is the wife who wants to divorce, she is not going to receive any compensation from her partner to be part of the 
parenting, she will have to compensate him with mutual consent in the custody of their child. Independently of these 
gender disparities, the necessity of cooperation and mutual consent in the custody of children may lead to a 
reallocation of property rights. 
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1988, approximately 37 states had some form of joint custody statute.8 This second wave of 
reforms seems to have affected the divorce rate of those states that also had introduced a 
unilateral reform, as can be seen in Figure 2. This figure represents the evolution of the average 
divorce rate across states that introduced both unilateral divorce and (the possibility of) joint 
custody (24 states), those which passed unilateral reforms (7 states), those with only a joint 
custody reform (14 states), and those states which did not change either divorce laws (6 states).9 
The long-dashed and short-dashed lines show the evolution of the difference in the average 
divorce rate between those states that introduced any reform, unilateral reform, joint custody 
reform or both, with those which did not pass a reform. These lines allow a comparison of the 
different evolution of average divorce rate by states which approved different aspects of law 
relevant to divorce. If anything, it is clearly observed that the decline in the average divorce rate 
occurs in those states that introduced both reforms, unilateral and joint custody regime, hence it 
seems that child custody law reform has neutralized the effect of unilateral divorce on divorce 
rates. On the other hand, those states that only passed unilateral reforms maintained higher 
divorce rates from at least the mid-1950s, around two divorces per 1,000 inhabitants per year 
more on average, until the mid-1990s with respect to those states that did not pass any reform. 
This simple comparison suggests that the dynamic response of divorce that is proposed by 
Wolfers may be confounding the reaction to the changes in custody law with a reverse response 
of divorce rates to the adoption of unilateral divorce laws. 
The divorce rate of those states that only passed a joint custody regime also seems to 
fall with respect to the divorce rate of those states which do not introduce any reform, see Figure 
2. Empirically, this may affect the estimates of the trend made by Wolfers, it may have confused 
the decline in the average divorce rate produced by the implementation of a new custody regime 
with a negative trend in the evolution of the divorce rate of those states that did not introduce 
unilateral divorce, since both states that passed the joint custody regime and those that did not 
pass any reform are considered as states without reforms in Wolfers (2006). 
From a theoretical point of view, the fall in the divorce rate of those states that only 
introduced custody reforms may be due to an increase in the cost of divorce. As Morrow (1991) 
remarks, when parents share physical custody after divorce, total costs are further increased 
since some of the major expenses are duplicated. The joint custody regime may also reduce the 
costs that would be incurred in the sole custody regime because sole custody resolutions tend to 
exacerbate parental differences and cause predictable post-divorce disputes which clearly 
generate greater costs of divorce (Halla and Hölzl 2007, and Folberg 1991). On the other hand, 
                                                 
8 In 1957, North Carolina was the first state to pass a statute allowing for the joint custody of children after 
dissolution of the marriage if it was in the best interest of the child. Twenty-two years later, California declared a 
public policy of encouraging parents to continue to share their parenting rights and responsibilities after divorce. 
Many of the statutes that were approved later were inspired by the early Californian legislation (Jacob, 1988). 
9 Unilateral divorce laws are coded from Wolfers (2006), joint custody regime is from Leo (2008) and Folberg 
(1991). 
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the divorce rate can also decline when investment in child quality increases under a joint 
custody regime and the benefits from child quality are considered as marriage-specific 
investments (Rasul 2006). 
Whether a joint custody regime affects the divorce rate is an empirical question which 
has received hardly any attention among researches. The first attempt to test this relationship 
was accomplished by Brinig and Buckley (1998), who found a negative effect of joint custody 
laws on divorce rates. This result has been rebutted, more recently, by Halla (2009). He does not 
find convincing evidence that the joint custody regime significantly affects divorce rates when 
adding a set of dummies for joint custody law à la Wolfers: 
tsttssrtsrrktskkts
TimeFEStateFEJCUDDR ,,,1,,1, εαβ +Σ+Σ+Σ+Σ= ≥≥ . (2)  
Rather than the dynamic response of divorce rates, rα , to the introduction of a joint 
custody regime, rtsJC ,, , we are interested in how divorce rates adjust to unilateral divorce once 
the change in custody law has been controlled. Panel B of Table 1 shows results running 
equation (2) on the same unbalanced panel of divorce rates that we used when we ran equation 
(1). The sign of the dynamic effects of divorce law reforms on divorce rates is consistent with 
previous findings in all three specifications, but the magnitudes of the dynamic responses 
considerably differ from those obtained in Wolfers’ analysis. Concretely, the decline of divorce 
rates due to the unilateral divorce reform is softened in specifications (1) and (2), where state 
and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends, respectively, are added. In addition, the 
conclusion that reforms have no significant effect after a decade is not quite robust when the 
dynamic response to custody law reforms is included. After controlling for quadratic state-
specific time trends, it is observed that the long-run effects are positive and statistically 
significant. Therefore, those results generate doubts about what is being captured by the dummy 
variables included in Panel A of Table 1.  
Alternatively, we can test whether divorce rate really decreases after the implementation 
of unilateral divorce just by focusing on those states that only passed unilateral divorce reforms. 
We would expect to observe a change in the sign of the coefficients if the kβ  coefficients of 
equation (1) are measuring the effect of the joint custody regime in addition to or instead of the 
unilateral divorce. To formalize these ideas, consider the following equation: 
tsttssrtsktsrkrkrtsrrktskkts
TimeFEStateFEJCUDJCUDDR ,,,,,,11,,1,,1, * εγαβ +Σ+Σ+ΣΣ+Σ+Σ= ≥≥≥≥
           (3) 
where DRs,t is the divorce rate in state s in year t, UDs,t,k represents a series of binary variables 
equal to one if a state has adopted unilateral divorce k years ago in year t and JCs,t,r is a dummy 
equal to one when a state has introduced a joint custody regime r years ago in year t. kβ  
coefficients are now measuring the dynamic response of divorce rates to the unilateral divorce 
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reforms in those states that only adopted unilateral divorce. If the impact of the introduction of a 
unilateral divorce system is reversed as time goes by, we may expect that the rise in the divorce 
rate produced by the adoption of unilateral divorce should be inverted, so kβ  in the subsequent 
periods after the adoption of unilateral divorce should be positive, but then it should turn 
negative. In contrast, if divorce rate do not decrease as a result of the adoption of unilateral 
divorce then kβ  should be always positive or non-significant.10 
Table 2 presents regression results of the kβ  coefficients in equation (3), but the full set 
of control variables and the dynamic effects of joint custody laws are included in the models. 
Results suggest that divorce rates rose after the adoption of unilateral divorce laws. The 
dynamic response after a decade is similar to that described by Wolfers (2006) in specifications 
(1) and (2); the effect of the introduction of unilateral divorce was reversed over the ensuing 
decade, although there are differences in the magnitude of the effect. 
An attractive feature of this approach is that it can speak to some of the potential 
sources of bias in Wolfers’ dynamic analysis. By comparing estimates in Table 2 with those in 
Panel A of Table 1, it is observed that the exclusion of controls for the adoption of joint custody 
laws leads to a greater negative impact of the unilateral divorce reforms on divorce rates. When 
controls for state-specific quadratic trends are added, the rise in divorce rates following the 
implementation of unilateral reform is persistent. The specification in column 3 of Table 2 
shows that the long-run effects are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
unilateral divorce has a permanent effect on divorce rates. The same is seen in the specification 
(3) in Panel B of Table 1, although the impact is greater for those states that just introduced 
unilateral divorce systems. Again, our results generate doubts about what is being picked up in 
the model implemented by Wolfers to analyse the dynamic response of divorce rates to 
unilateral divorce reforms. 
Couples with and without Children 
It is complicated to interpret the differences between our estimates and Wolfers’ results because 
the divorce rate includes a sub-population that is not affected by the joint custody reform. The 
necessity of mutual consent required by the joint custody reform is limited to couples with 
minors, but the divorce rate includes both couples with children and couples without children. 
                                                 
10 Although we are not interested in the effect of joint custody on divorce rate, rα , the dynamic response of divorce 
rates to the custody laws would be expected to be negative if the costs of divorce increase for those states that only 
introduced custody law reforms. On the other hand, for those states affected by both waves of reforms, we might 
expect 
rkr ,γα +  to be negative, at least until reversing the positive effect of the unilateral reform on divorce rate, 
when the increase in divorce rate following unilateral divorce reform is reversed due to the interruption of joint 
custody reforms. In addition, 
rkk ,γβ + is not expected to turn negative since the effect of the unilateral reform would 
be cancelled by the joint custody regime. 
rkk ,γβ +  is capturing the dynamic effect of unilateral reforms for those 
states that introduced both unilateral divorce and joint custody reform. 
 
 10
This is problematic since the behavior of the sub-population not affected by the custody law 
reform could be driving our results instead of the reaction of couples with minors to custody law 
reforms. 
It is certainly difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to test the effect of the changes 
in divorce law reforms on all the states considered in the analysis due to the scarcity of data. 
The detailed information on the number of divorces by number of children involved is publicly 
available in the Vital Statistics of the United States for each state belonging to the divorce-
registration area (DRA) until 1990. Figure 3 separately shows the evolution of the average 
divorce rate for couples with and without children at the time of divorce for those states that 
implemented only unilateral divorce, only joint custody reforms and both reforms.11 Clearly, we 
observe higher divorce rates for couples with children (red and black lines) and a decreasing 
trend in the divorce rate for couples with children (black line) but not in the divorce rate of 
couples without children (blue line) from the early 1980s when the joint custody law was 
adopted by most of the states.12 The evolution of the difference between the average divorce rate 
of couples with and without children (see long-dashed and short-dashed lines) is maintained as 
quite similar for all three kinds of reforms from the 1960s. As expected, the divorce rate of 
couples with children considerably decreased in those states that introduced both a unilateral 
divorce system and a joint custody law, after the introduction of the new custody system (black 
line), compared with the divorce rate of couples with children in those states that only 
introduced unilateral divorce reforms (red line). This suggests that our results might be driven 
by a change in the divorce rate of couples with children in those states that introduced joint 
custody laws as opposed to a decreasing trend in the divorce rate of those childless couples or a 
differential distribution of divorces among couples with and without children across states that 
implemented different divorce law reforms. 
To probe this further, we rerun equation (1) and equation (3) using as dependent 
variable the divorce rates among childless couples and among couples with children, with data 
for all states belonging to the divorce-registration area (DRA).13 In these regressions, we would 
not expect to find any effect of custody law reforms on the divorce rates of childless couples 
since joint custody reform would not be an issue in the divorce decisions of such couples. Thus, 
we would not expect changes in the estimates of the dynamic response of divorce rate to 
unilateral reform when we run equation (1) and (3) for couples without minors.  
                                                 
11 The number of states varied substantially, from 18 states in 1960 to 32 states in 1990. For 18 states there are no 
data available and in the case of 15 states some observations are missing. 
12 The fall in the average divorce rate of childless couples (blue line) takes place two years prior to the approval of 
the first legislation on joint custody in the 1970s. Thus, we would not expect that this change was determined by the 
custody reforms. 
13 We also ran all the analyses using only data for those states belonging to the DRA and the results are quite similar. 
However, we prefer to use data for all the states to make our findings comparable to previous works. 
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Figure 4 shows the results graphically. As predicted, we observe differences in the 
coefficients capturing the response of the divorce rate to the unilateral divorce reform for 
couples with children with that being remarkable when quadratic state-specific time trends are 
added. For the case of childless couples, the coefficients slightly differ when joint custody 
reforms are included, but again, those differences are almost insignificant when quadratic state-
specific time trends are included.  
Because we would not expect joint custody reform to have any effect on the divorce 
rates of childless couples, the differences with respect to that prediction observed in Figure 4 
may indicate that the kβ  coefficients of equation (1) may be capturing second-order effects. 
The change in the custody law may produce two different effects in the behavior of couples 
without minor children. Immediately, it can lead to a decrease in the number of divorces since 
there are fewer opportunities outside marriage to find someone to remarry due to the increase in 
married population (marriage rates having increased as a result of the adoption of new custody 
laws (Halla, 2009)). Further, an increase in the married population implies an increase in the 
population at risk of divorce, thus, the divorce rate is more likely to rise in the subsequent 
periods. In Figure 4, we observe an increase in the coefficients of the unilateral divorce reform 
when controls for the joint custody reforms and state specific trends are added, with this being 
ten years after the approval of unilateral reforms. This suggests that those coefficients might be 
capturing second-order effects of joint custody on marriage rather than the unilateral divorce 
reforms alone. We can then detect a decrease in the effect of the unilateral divorce reform when 
the same controls are added. Again, this could be due to the fact that the coefficients are 
capturing second-order effects of custody reforms in addition to or instead of unilateral divorce.  
The decline in the divorce rate for couples with minor children in those states that 
introduced joint custody laws can also be attributed to other factors, such as an increase in the 
age of individuals that divorce, since older individuals are less likely to have young children or 
a decline in the number of children in married-couple families. As can be seen in Figure 5, the 
number of children that were involved in divorce slightly declined in the 1980s, coinciding with 
the period of implementation of joint custody laws (data from the Vital Statistics of the United 
States). However, the fact that the rate of children involved in divorce per 1,000 children under 
18 years of age also slightly declined from 1981 may reinforce the idea that what is declining is 
the number of divorces of couples with children. 
Interpretation of the results presented in this and the next sections may also be difficult 
because there could be other determinants of divorce, which may vary by state but have little to 
do with the changes in divorce laws. Other determinants of divorce that have been suggested 
are; economic growth (South, 1985), price stability (Nunley, 2009), unemployment (Jensen and 
Smith, 1990), female labor force participation (Allen, 1998), public transfers, tax laws and 
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welfare reforms (Bitler et al., 2004; Tjøtta and Vaage, 2008), property distribution within 
marriage (Gray, 1998), fertility behavior (Svarer and Verner, 2008), religiosity (Vaaler et al., 
2009), television (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009) or even culture (Furtado et al., 2010). Not 
controlling for these demographic and economic characteristics would be problematic if factors 
associated with a rising divorce rate are more likely in states that did not introduce divorce 
reforms, and might lead to a bias in the estimates as the dynamic response to changes in divorce 
laws might be capturing differences in the evolution of these characteristics by state, rather than 
the effect of the reforms. Of course, the inclusion of these omitted factors may bias the estimates 
of the dynamic response to divorce law reforms when they are correlated with the divorce law 
reforms. For instance, changes in divorce laws have been found to affect marriage rates (Halla, 
2009), which affects the population at risk of divorce and to reduce fertility rates (Drewianka, 
2008). The introduction of measures of economic performance in the estimations, such as 
female labor force participation and female earnings, or other demographic variables such as 
fertility rates, may also produce problems of endogeneity since many of these measures of 
economic performance have not been truly exogenous (Allen 2002). Causality between the 
divorce rate and these variables may run in both directions (Becker 1981); for example, Ressler 
and Waters (2000) found that the divorce rate may be influenced by and may itself influence 
female earnings. To make our results comparable with previous analysis we do not introduce 
these socio-economic variables into the analysis. 
IV.  Child Support Enforcement 
The analysis presented in the previous subsection has left out the third wave of transforming 
aspects of law relevant to divorce that has occurred since the mid-1970s when the U.S. 
Congress implemented several reforms aimed at enforcing support obligations to prevent 
poverty among children and to reduce welfare costs. Marking the beginning of what would 
become an important period in the development of child support legislation, it established the 
Federal Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Program as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 
1975.14 This law created a separate division, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement 
(OCSE), to oversee the operation of a Child Support Enforcement program and required each 
state to establish a Child Support Enforcement agency to be responsible for that program. 
Subsequent reforms in 1984, the Family Support Act in 1988, the Child Support Recovery Act 
of 1992, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and the 
Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act in 1998 required all the states to revise and expand CSE 
services and techniques.15  
                                                 
14 Prior to 1975, child support policy was dictated largely by family law in each state and enforced by the court 
system. To obtain a child support order, to enforce an existing order that was not being paid or to establish legal 
paternity, a custodial parent had to go to court.  
15 See Garfinkel et al. (1998) for a review of child support policies in the U.S.A. 
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The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 required every state’s Child 
Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) to develop mandatory procedures for withholding 
income as well as expedited processes for establishing and enforcing support orders (such as 
income tax refund interceptions and property liens), without having to request court 
intervention. The Family Support Act of 1988 requires every state to implement various 
procedures for immediate and mandatory wage-withholding for all support orders being 
enforced by every State’s CSEA. By 1994, states were required to provide for immediate 
withholding of wages for all support orders (regardless of whether IV-D services were used or 
payments are in arrears). The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 imposed a federal criminal 
penalty for the wilful failure to pay a past due child support obligation to a child living in 
another state and that has remained unpaid for more than one year or is greater than $5,000. 
Failure to pay was punishable by up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine. Second and 
subsequent violations were punishable by two years imprisonment and/or a fine. Upon the 
implementation of these laws the child support collections increased from $2.4 billion in 1984 
to $8 billion in 1992. The number of absent parents located to establish and enforce or modify 
an order rose from almost 900,000 in 1984 to 3.7 million in 1992, and the number of paternities 
established also increased, which is a crucial first step in child support cases, from nearly 
220,000 in 1984 to 520,000 in 1992 (OCSE Annual Reports to Congress). 
 The CSE was also a top priority during the Clinton administration. Child support 
collections doubled from $9 billion in 1993 to nearly $18 billion in 2000. The number of absent 
parents located to establish and enforce or modify an order also doubled, from 3.7 million in 
1992 to nearly 7 million in 1998. On paternity establishment, nearly 900,000 paternities were 
established in 2000, almost twice as many as in 1992. The Clinton administration also passed 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 and 
the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act in 1998. The PRWORA introduced significant revisions 
in child support legislation to improve the functioning of the Child Support Enforcement 
program. These changes included requiring states to increase the percentage of fathers 
identified, establishing an integrated network linking all states to collect information about the 
location and assets of parents, requiring states to implement more enforcement techniques such 
as withholding wages, seizing assets, and even revoking the driving and professional licenses of 
those parents who owed child support, and also allowed for the creation of the New Hires 
database, which requires all employers to report information about newly hired employees. The 
Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 established two new categories of felony offenses 
punishable by a fine and up to two years in prison. The offenses were traveling in interstate or 
foreign commerce with the intent to evade a support obligation if the obligation has remained 
unpaid for more than one year or is greater than $5,000; and wilfully failing to pay a child 
support obligation regarding a child residing in another state if the obligation has remained 
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unpaid for more than two years or is greater than $10,000. It is arguable that all these policies 
that aimed at ensuring that child support will be paid might have an effect on the evolution of 
divorce rates. 
Since there was more than one child on average involved in each divorce from the mid-
1950s until 1976, and almost one child on average from 1976 onwards (see Figure 5), the 
incorporation of these reforms seems to be necessary to estimate precisely the effect of no-fault 
unilateral reform on divorce rates. Additionally, although changes in joint custody laws can 
affect divorce rates, the percentage of joint custody agreements is not quite significant. By 1990, 
the wife was awarded custody of the children in almost three-quarters of the divorces with 
children involved. Joint custody was the second most common arrangement, at 16 percent 
(Monthly Vital Statistics Report in 1990). The largest percentage of children living with one 
parent were living with their mother and this fact did not considerably change in the period 
considered, see Figure 6. Therefore, changes in the financial obligation of non-custodial parents, 
i.e., child support, might play a more important role in divorce.16 
It is possible that what is being captured by the dynamic response of divorce rates to 
divorce law reform is the application of Child Support Enforcement programs. To pick up the 
effect of CSE on divorce, we ran equation (3) by including several measured of CSE efforts. An 
alternative strategy would be the introduction of the legislative history of reforms that enforce 
child support. However, this might fail in accounting for the effects of these reforms on divorce 
rates, since by using this strategy of identification we are not measuring the effectiveness of the 
application of those reforms. Federal laws establish the guidelines under which each state CSE 
agency must operate, but there is considerable variation in the manner in which the laws are 
implemented since child support enforcement efforts are executed by state authorities (for a 
review of state statutes, see Sorensen and Halpern (1999)). This is relevant in the analysis of the 
response of divorce rates to divorce law reforms when less restrictive divorce laws are 
associated with greater state interest in child support enforcement. Couples that live in states 
that passed joint custody law or where they cannot unilaterally divorce might fail less in their 
child support obligations due to the necessity of mutual consent in child custody. Therefore, 
those states that only introduced unilateral divorce would need to be stricter in putting child 
support enforcement into effect to achieve their objective of reducing child poverty and welfare 
costs. 
                                                 
16 From a theoretical point of view, the effect of the increase in the CSE efforts on divorce is ambiguous. For men, 
normally the absent parent, it may raise the expected financial responsibility in divorce, and thus it increases the costs 
of divorce. For women, those in charge of children after divorce, the increase in child support increases the mother’s 
expected income after marriage which may reduce the costs of divorce for these women. Thus, two opposite effects 
might be operating (Nixon, 1997). 
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We use state-level administrative data provided by the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE).17 The status of the application of the child support enforcement in all 
states considered in the analysis is reported yearly from fiscal year 1977 by the OCSE.18 Four 
different variables are used to represent the effectiveness of the child support enforcement 
program. As Nixon (1997) and Heim (2003) have done, we analyze the effect of enforcing child 
support orders and increasing collections by using the collection rate variable, defined as the 
percentage of CSE cases in which a collection was made by obligation, and by including the 
average collections, calculated as the dollars collected per CSE case divided by state per capita 
GDP. Following Heim (2003), we have also included two more variables to control for 
differential effects of the CSE policies. We use a paternity rate, measured as the number of 
paternities established in a given year per 1,000 inhabitants, and a location rate, defined as the 
number of absent parents located in a given year per 1,000 inhabitants.19 A higher value of any 
of these variables represents more effective CSE. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3, where population-weighted sample means of the 
CSE variables by divorce law regime are included. The average state that introduced joint 
custody and unilateral divorce has a slightly greater percentage of CSE cases collected and a 
slightly greater average of collections than the average state that passed any other divorce law 
reform. A similar pattern is also observed for both paternity rate and location rate. On average, 
those states that implemented joint custody or joint custody and unilateral divorce make greater 
efforts in CSE.  
 Table 4 presents estimates of the dynamic effect of unilateral divorce reforms after 
controlling for the effect of CSE on divorce by using the collection rate, Columns (1) to (3), and 
the average collections, Columns (4) to (6), separately.20 As can be seen in Table 4, the results 
                                                 
17 Although OCSE data includes detailed information on CSE programs, parents not utilizing OCSE services are not 
included in its publications; see Guyer et al. (1996). This can affect our estimates if greater presence of OCSE non-
users is associated with less restrictive divorce laws. Those states under unilateral divorce laws may need to be more 
stringent in applying CSE programs since parents can fail more in their child support obligations. This can lead to an 
increase in the number of parents carrying out with their child support payments, even if those parents do not utilize 
the OCSE services because the threat of making them pay their obligations is credible. Unfortunately, there is no data 
set that contains information on both parents using OCSE and non-users. Our estimated effects of CSE efforts on 
divorce rate would not capture the CSE effect well, and we would expect that the CSE programs more negatively 
affect the divorce rate, thus the dummy variables capturing the effect of unilateral divorce reforms still pick up the 
unilateral divorce effect in addition to the CSE efforts. 
18 The data come from the third Annual Report to the U.S. Congress on the Child Support Enforcement program for 
the period October l,1977-September 30, 1978 to the 13th Annual Report for the period ending in 1988. Data from the 
first annual report is not included in the analysis since it differs in the period covered, from January 4, 1975 to June 
30, 1976. For the same reason, we do not include data from the special supplementa1 report which was issued to 
cover the period July 1 to September 30, 1976. Information from the second report is not included since the average 
annual child support enforcement caseload is not available. 
19 Due to lack of data we cannot introduce into the analysis precisely the same measures of CSE used by Nixon (1997) 
or Heim (2003). However, our database contains information for a longer period, from 1977 to 1988; Heim (2003) 
only utilised data for the period 1991–1995 to capture the effect of CSE efforts on divorce rates. 
20 All those measures of CSE efforts take a value of 0 from 1956 to 1977 and then they take the value of the CSE 
measure. This can be problematic since we are not considering previous differences in the child support policies by 
state, however, the introduction of state fixed effects and state-specific time trends should mitigate this problem. We 
have also repeated the analysis by using only data from 1978 and the results do not change substantially, we observed 
no effect of unilateral divorce on divorce rate in the long run. 
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do not differ from those observed when we just introduce controls for custody reforms in all the 
specifications (Table 2). The dynamic response of divorce rates to unilateral divorce reform 
after a decade is similar to that observed by Wolfers (2006) in specifications (1) and (2), when 
we introduced collection rate, and in specifications (4) and (5), after controlling for average 
collections. The effect of the introduction of unilateral divorce was reversed over the subsequent 
decade. However, when controls for state-specific quadratic trends are added, the rise in divorce 
rate following the introduction of unilateral divorce reform seems to be permanent. 
 Another strategy to capture the effect of the Child Support Enforcement efforts consists 
in individually considering the effect of the child support reinforcement by divorce law regime. 
As explained above, if CSE efforts differ under different divorce laws, we would expect to 
observe differences in the impact of the CSE on divorce rate by divorce law regime. 
 The results in Table 5 suggest that the distinction between CSE efforts by divorce law 
reform is empirically important for our purposes. Although the sign on the long-run effect of the 
unilateral divorce reform does not turn positive in all the coefficients of interest, albeit those are 
not statistically significant, it seems that what is driving the results obtained by Wolfers ten 
years after the introduction of unilateral divorce are those changes in divorce laws that govern 
the aftermath of divorce, see Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5). 
 We have also looked at the effect of other CSE policies, paternity rate and location rate, 
on the divorce rate to check whether our results are maintained when we extend CSE variables. 
The inclusion of the four variables used to measure the CSE efforts together in the same 
specification is possible since those variables are not highly correlated, see Table 6. As can be 
seen in Table 7, our results are quite consistent. 
 Further, we reran all the regressions presented in this research by using a longer panel 
with data on divorce rates from 1956 to 1998. Table 8 shows the results on the dynamic effect 
of divorce law reform, excluding controls for custody law reforms and CSE policies in Columns 
(1) to (3) and including those controls in Columns (4) to (6). Our results are quite robust. 
Therefore, the long-run effect of unilateral divorce on divorce rate observed by Wolfers (2006) 
seems to be capturing the effect of the aspects that regulate the aftermath of divorce. 
As in the previous section, we repeated the analysis individually for couples with and 
without children in order to check whether our results operate through the behavior of the 
childless couples, the sub-population not affected by the CSE efforts at the time of divorce. We 
ran equation (1) and equation (3) using as dependent variable the divorce rate among couples 
with and without children and controlling for CSE measures.  
The results show greater differences in the coefficients measuring the response of 
divorce rate to unilateral divorce reform for couples with children when quadratic state-specific 
time trends are included, see Figure 7. For childless couples, we observe slight differences in 
the coefficients after adding quadratic state-specific time trends, but as explained above, those 
 17
differences can be due to second-order effects (Halla 2009). Although, to our knowledge, there 
is no published research studying the effect of the CSE program on marriage rates, stricter 
enforcement efforts seem to influence fertility decisions and the investment in child outcomes 
(Aizer and McLanahan 2006). Increases in CSE efforts provide men with clear disincentives to 
have children in order to reduce the costs of divorce, hence we would expect an increase in the 
number of childless couples at risk of divorce, and so, an increase in the divorce rate. If the 
coefficients measuring the effect of unilateral divorce captured these second-order effects in 
addition to or instead of the unilateral divorce response, the magnitude of the effect should 
decrease after controlling for CSE measures. The results suggest that the effect of the CSE 
efforts also seems to be picking up by the coefficients capturing the dynamic response of 
divorce rates to unilateral divorce even after separating the divorce rates of couples with and 
without children. 
We make out a case for the importance of controlling for the aftermath of divorce to 
determine the effect of divorce law reforms on divorce rates, but acknowledge that our list of 
controls is rather limited. For example, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Benefits, or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) since 1996, are not considered 
in our analysis. Our omission of these variables is partly due to the fact that the CSE program 
aims at reducing those welfare benefits. It is unclear whether we would want to include them 
since, as Hoffman and Duncan (1995) showed, welfare benefits had a small effect on the 
probability that a married woman will become divorced, thus it is not a significant determinant 
of divorce decisions. 
V. Permanent shocks in U.S. divorce rates 
Up to this point, we have considered whether the reforms in relevant aspects of the aftermath of 
divorce are important to determine the effect of unilateral reforms on divorce rates. In this 
section, we explore the frequency of permanent shocks in divorce rates by examining whether 
the divorce rate is a stationary series, exhibits a unit root, or is stationary around a process 
subject to structural breaks.21 This analysis is necessary since even after controlling for law 
reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce it is unclear whether the rise in divorce as a result 
of the approval of unilateral divorce laws is persistent. Our results are sensitive to the inclusion 
of state-specific trends.22 Thus we use an alternative econometric technique that has been used 
to track the evolution of economic and social variables subject to public and legal interventions 
like the unemployment rate (Mitchell, 1993; Papell et al., 2000) or the rate of crime (Narayan et 
al., 2005), and to study the effect of policy interventions: the Boston Gun Project (Piehl et al., 
2003) or Public Interest Litigation in India (Rathinam and Raja, 2008). 
                                                 
21 Note that permanent means here that the change is still in effect given a sample of data, but not that the change will 
last forever. 
22 This weakness is also observed in Wolfers (2006); the effect of divorce law on divorce rate is also quite sensitive 
to the introduction of state-specific quadratic trends.  
 18
We also present possible explanations for the permanent shifts in the divorce rate. We 
relate it to divorce law reforms and to the law reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce. 
These policy changes can be considered as major events that are known to have occurred in the 
period considered in the analysis and which may have caused the structural change in the 
behavior of the divorce rate series.  In this case, the analysis is more interpretive since, in order 
to determine whether a policy reform has had a permanent impact on divorce rate, we simply 
compare the timing of the reforms with the break dates in the stationary divorce rate series. 
Unit Roots in U.S. divorce rate series 
We first apply standard unit root methods to the divorce rate for 50 states from 1956 to 1998 
(Louisiana is excluded because of the scarcity of data).23 Formally, consider the following 
expression: 
 ttt DRDR ερα ++= −1 ,     (4) 
where tDR  is the divorce rate, α  and ρ  are parameters and tε  is the perturbation term. If 
11 <<− ρ , fluctuations would be transitory. The divorce rate will be a stationary time series 
and any shock will dissipate over time.24 However, when 1=ρ , any sudden shock would have 
permanent effects on the long-run level of the divorce rate. In this case, the divorce rate will be 
a nonstationary time series, and the stochastic process modeled by equation (4) will be a random 
walk with drift (Brockwell and Davis, 1991) which is referred to as a unit root process (see 
Banerjee et al., 1993; Hamilton, 1994; and Gujarati, 1995). 
In order to test for the presence of unit roots, where 1=ρ , we apply Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). The ADF test for nontrending data is 
carried out by running the following regression: 
( ) tk
i
titt DRcDRDR εγα ∑
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−− +Δ++=Δ
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11 ,    (5) 
where 1−−=Δ ttt DRDRDR , ( )1−= ργ , and with k being the number of lags added to 
ensure that the residuals, tε , are Gaussian White Noises.25 The optimal k is chosen using a 
“general-to-specific procedure” based on the t-statistic (Ng and Perron, 1995). The null and 
alternative hypotheses are, respectively, 0:0 =γH , 0: <γAH . If γ  is found to be equal to 
                                                 
23 We favor the use of the divorce rate with a longer series since the results are less reliable with data from 1956 to 
1988. We have also repeated the analysis with data from 1950 to 2007, the longest series on divorce rate available; 
the results are quite similar and are available upon request. 
24 A stochastic process is said to be stationary if its mean and variance are time-independent and if the covariance 
between any two periods depends only on the lag and not on the actual time at which the covariance is calculated. 
25 The residuals are Gaussian White Noises when they have a zero mean and a constant variance that is uncorrelated 
with sε  for st ≠ . 
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0, then the divorce rate series will follow a random walk. If, on the other hand, γ  is found to be 
significantly smaller than 0, the divorce rate will be stationary around α . 
Table 9 shows a summary of the results of the individual state unit root tests. Results 
suggest that the unit root scenario seems to describe the experience of the U.S. divorce rates 
best. When using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
divorce rate is not rejected for four out of fifteen states, or 8 percent of the states, at the 10 
percent level of significance.26 For these four states, fluctuations are transitory but for the rest of 
the states any sudden shock has permanent effects on divorce rate. Although the ADF tests are 
widely used, these common tests are biased towards the nonrejection of the null hypothesis of a 
unit root (Perron, 1989). This is problematic since a stationary process with a mean that exhibits 
a one-time permanent change in level may previously have been identified as a unit-root process 
(Perron, 1990). We revisit this issue in the next subsection. 
Robustness Checks: Panel Unit Root Test 
We have also considered the states jointly in a panel in order to test for a unit root in a balanced 
panel (excluding California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, and West Virginia) and 
in an unbalanced panel that includes all states. We use three different panel unit root tests. The 
first is the Levin et al. (2002) test, which tests the null hypothesis that all series have a unit root, 
versus the alternative where all series are stationary on the balanced panel. The second is the 
less restrictive test developed by Im et al. (2003). This test allows us to test the null of a unit 
root in all series, versus the alternative that some of the series are stationary, with a potentially 
varying autoregressive parameter. We then use the Pesaran (2007) test for unit roots in 
heterogenous panels with cross-section dependence. Pesaran's CADF eliminates the cross-
dependence by augmenting the standard DF (or ADF) regressions with the cross-section 
averages of lagged levels and with first-differences of the individual series. Parallel to the Im et 
al. (2003) test, Pesaran’s CADF test is consistent under the alternative that only a fraction of the 
series is stationary. Moreover, to test for unit root in an unbalanced panel, we use a 
generalization of the Pesaran’s CADF test (Pesaran, 2007). 
Panel B in Table 9 reports the results of applying the panel unit root tests presented 
above. The results indicate that it is hard to maintain that all divorce rate series show unit root 
process. When using the Levin–Lin–Chu panel unit root test and the Im–Pesaran–Shin test, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root even at the 10 percent level. However, the 
Pesaran’s test shows that, when controlling for cross-sectional dependence, the null hypothesis 
of unit root is rejected at the 1 percent level. This is also observed when Pesaran’s test is applied 
to an unbalanced panel. Thus, the evidence in favor of a unit root in the divorce rate is weaker. 
                                                 
26 We also ran ADF tests incorporating a trend and the results are quite consistent. 
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Unit Roots in the Presence of a Structural Break 
In the presence of a one-time structural break, the standard ADF tests are biased towards the 
nonrejection of the null hypothesis due to a misspecification of the deterministic trend (Perron, 
1989). The estimator of the autoregressive parameter goes asymptotically to values close to one 
when the variable is generated by a stationary process in which the effect of a structural break is 
present. In our finite divorce rate series, this can be problematic since what we identified as a 
unit root process could have been specified better as a stationary process around a persistent 
shock. To tackle this type of problem, we utilize a unit root test proposed by Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992), which works properly in a structural break framework where the date of the 
break is supposed to be unknown, and is suitable for nontrending data.27 
We estimate an additive outlier (AO) model or crash model for each state divorce rate, 
which allows for a sudden change in mean (the change is assumed to take effect 
instantaneously).28  The model is estimated by the following two expressions: 
ttt DUDR ηδμ ++=      (6) 
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where tη  is the estimated residual from equation (6), with TB being the date of the break, 
1=tDTB  if 1+= TBt , and is 0 otherwise, and 0=tDU  if TBt ≤ , and is 1 otherwise. Both 
equations are estimated in two stages by OLS for each break year 1,...,2 −+= TkTB , with T 
being the number of observations and k the  truncation lag parameter (Perron and Vogelsang, 
1992).  
The results of applying the AO model to test for a unit root in the divorce rates of each 
state in the U.S.A. under the null versus stationarity around a shifting mean under the alternative 
are also summarized in Table 9. The effect of taking into account the possible shock is quite 
substantial. At the 10 percent confidence level, the unit root null hypothesis is rejected in favor 
of a regime-wise stationary process in which the effect of a structural break is present for 48 
percent of the states, or 24 out of 50 states. Thus, the results suggest that there is not a single 
scenario. These findings do provide evidence in favor of both unit root processes and stationary 
processes subject to a structural break. 
                                                 
27 Other papers in which the breakpoint selection is also endogenized are Banerjee et al. (1992) and Zivot and 
Andrews (1992). 
28 Since Wolfers (2006) found different short-run and long-run effects of divorce law reforms on divorce rates, it is 
arguable that changes in divorce rates take place gradually. Thus, from a robustness perspective, we also used 
innovational outlier models (IO) which allows for gradual changes in divorce rates. Our results are quite similar, 
although some of the structural breaks are detected some years later than those determined when using the AO model. 
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Table 10 reports the results by state. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for 
Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi and South Dakota at the 1 percent level, for Hawaii, Michigan, 
Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and 
Washington at the 5 percent level and for Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas and West Virginia at the 10 percent level. For these stationary 
states, most shocks cause temporary movements of the divorce rate around the equilibrium 
level, but occasionally a shock causes permanent changes in the equilibrium rate. All these 
structural breaks are positive, which reflects the rise in the divorce rate among the states, and all 
but two break dates are grouped around the late 1960s and the early 1970s. For the rest of the 
states, the nonstationary states, all shocks have permanent effect on the level of divorce, thus, 
there is no tendency to return to a stable value.  
Multiple Structural Breaks 
Since socio-economic variables rarely show just one break (Clemente et al., 1998), and given 
that there is no economic reason for restricting the analysis to one break, we also explore the 
existence of multiple structural breaks in the divorce rate series once stationarity has been 
established using the methodology proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003).29 For the case 
with no trending regressors, we first estimated the linear regression with only a constant as 
regressor: 
ttt DUDR ηδμ ++=      (8) 
with tDR  being the divorce rate, the observed independent variable. 1=tDU  if TBt > , and 0 
otherwise where TB is the break date explicitly treated as unknown. The method of estimation is 
based on the least-squares principle. The sup-F statistic is obtained by maximizing the 
difference between the restricted (without DUt) and unrestricted sums of squared residuals over 
all potential break dates. When a break point is found, the full sample is divided into two 
subsamples at the break point, and subsequently the test is applied to each of the subsamples. 
This subdivision process does not end until the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
additional structural changes, or until the subsamples become too small. In order to establish the 
final breaks, we use the repartition method defined in Bai (1997), estimating breaks one at a 
time.30  We allow for heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the residuals. The method utilized is 
Andrews’ (1991) automatic bandwidth with AR(1) approximation and the quadratic kernel. It is 
                                                 
29 We have also repeated the analysis of unit root considering the presence of two endogenous break points by using 
the methodology developed by Clemente et al. (1998). The results are quite consistent and are available upon request. 
Because of the short timespan of the data, the use of other econometric techniques to test for unit roots allowing for 
the possibility of multiple structural breaks is problematic (Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997). 
30 For those U.S. states in which the sequential procedure found no break since the supFT(1) test is not significant, we 
use the LWZ method which is a modified Schwarz criterion proposed by Liu et al. (1997) to determine the number of 
breaks, see Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
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imposed a trimming of 15 percent, thus each segment has at least fiftteen observations, and 
allow up to five breaks (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003). 
Table 11 presents the significant break dates at the 5 percent level from the Bai and 
Perron tests for multiple structural changes. It also reports the mean divorce rates before the first 
break and after each subsequent break. For those states in which the one-break unit root tests 
provide evidence of stationarity, it is observed that 14 out of the 24 states (Alabama, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Washington) have one significant break at the 
5 percent level; four states (Arkansas, Massachusetts, Vermont and West Virginia) present two 
breaks; another four states have three structural breaks (Idaho, Montana, New Jersey and Texas) 
and just two states (Oregon and Utah) exhibit four breaks. The break dates chosen by the Bai 
and Perron procedure are close to that determined by the unit root in the presence of the one-
time structural break. There are not more than three years of difference between the break dates 
chosen by the one-time break test of unit root and those found by the Bai and Perron procedure.  
There are several aspects of these results to which it is worth drawing attention. Our 
findings provide strong empirical evidence against the view that all shocks have temporary 
effects on divorce. For all of the states, we detected at least one significant structural break. 
These occasional shocks cause persistent changes in the equilibrium rate itself, thus divorce rate 
series may be characterized as being stationary around occasional persistent shocks. 
None of the 35 significant breaks detected in the 1960s and 1970s is negative, reflecting 
the increase in divorce in that period. However, the seven breaks chosen in the 1980s and 1990s 
are all negative. Note that the average divorce rate after those negative breaks is always greater 
than that before the first break and even greater than the average divorce rate after the structural 
breaks detected in the 1960s. Thus, the rise in the divorce rate during the 1970s is not 
compensated with the fall in the divorce rate during the 1980s and 1990s. Another interesting 
finding is that most of the break dates are clustered. Out of 42 breaks, 29 occurred between 
1968 and 1978, but the greater concentration of breaks occurred from 1968 to 1972. Six of the 
breaks are found in the early and mid-1960s and just four in the 1980s and three in the 1990s.31 
All these permanent changes in divorce can be related to major events that occurred since the 
1960s, such as a particular government policy: divorce law reforms, custody law reforms, or/and 
child support programs, but can be also associated with economic crises, wars, or other factors. 
We revisit this issue in the next subsection. 
                                                 
31 It is likely that the methodology applied here was unable to detect breaks in the late 1980s and 1990s due to the 
proximity of the end of the sample. Once we extend the sample with data from 1950 to 2007, the number of breaks in 
the 1980s and 1990s considerably increases as well as those in the 1950s and 1960s, although there are still a greater 
number of breaks in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Note that the sign of the breaks do not change; it is positive from 
the 1950s to the 1970s and negative in the subsequent decades. 
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We also applied the Bai and Perron methodology to the 26 states for which the single-
break tests do not provide evidence of stationarity. Even though we cannot strictly speak of a 
change in the mean caused by a structural break, since the assumptions of the Bai and Perron 
methodology are not satisfied, we consider these results to be an illustration of the pattern of the 
divorce rates for the nonstationary states. All but one breaks chosen in the 1960s and 1970s are 
positive, the exception is Nevada, and among those located since the 1980s only one structural 
break is positive, Kentucky in 1985. 32  Thus, these findings suggest that stationary and 
nonstationary divorce rates have a similar pattern, although for the nonstationary divorce rate 
series all shocks have permanent effects on the level of divorce and for those stationary around 
occasional breaks only these breaks cause permanent changes in the divorce rate. 
Reforms and Permanent Shifts in Divorce Rates 
The time-series analysis allows us to ascertain the break dates, which is valuable information for 
studying whether a structural break on a certain date can be associated with a major event. We 
focus on comparing the timing of the main policy reforms and the timing of the structural 
breaks which are determined by using the Bai and Perron test. Of course such an analysis is 
interpretive in nature hence here it is not possible to derive causality between law reforms and 
divorce rates. 
We concentrate first on the divorce rate series for which the Bai and Perron test is 
applicable, or those 24 states for which the unit root null can be rejected by the single-break test 
of unit root. Of these 24, a total of 13 have a break that is located close to the time of the divorce 
law reforms that were passed beginning in the 1970s. Only for the case of South Dakota is no a 
structural break in the divorce rate detected close to the adoption of the unilateral divorce law in 
1985. For five of the thirteen U.S. states, (Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota and Oregon), the 
structural break is chosen in the year in which the divorce law was reformed or two years later. 
In the case of the other eight divorce rate series (Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Texas and Washington), the breaks are found before the reform although 
the reform dates are included in the confidence interval at the 95 percent. Admittedly, one may 
conjecture that there are other factors associated with five of these eight breaks because those 
structural breaks are located more than two years before the reforms and because they coincide 
with the break dates of those states that did not pass any divorce law reform in the period 
analysed. 
                                                 
32 To check whether our results are sensitive to the introduction of Nevada and Kentucky, we also ran several simple 
robustness checks on the analysis of previous sections. First, we drop Nevada since the behavior of the divorce rate is 
clearly different to that of the rest of the states and may be driving the results. In another specification, we drop 
Kentucky since the divorce rate seems to have increased in this state during the 1980s which can affect our estimates 
of the dynamic effect of the divorce rate on the unilateral divorce reforms. The results are quite consistent and are 
available upon request. 
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The structural breaks chosen in the 1960s and 1970s for the other ten states (Arkansas, 
Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont 
and West Virginia) clearly cannot be associated with divorce law reforms in these states since 
they did not introduce those policy changes. One can conjecture that other major events caused 
all the permanent changes in that period since those changes are similar in all the states 
independently of the introduction of unilateral divorce. As an alternative explanation, it is 
possible to hypothesize that the Vietnam War was one of these particular events.33 An increase 
in the number of divorces is a general pattern observed during and after a war (Pavalko and 
Elder, 1990; South, 1985). The rise in the divorce rate might be produced by a decrease in the 
population after the wartime but also by the weakening of marriages under wartime conditions, 
the increase in war marriages, the separation imposed by the war, the opportunities for adultery 
and even by an increase in the options for remarriage due to the rise in the number of widows 
(Philips, 1988). Fourteen of the fifteen breaks are found in the Vietnam War and post-war 
period in those states without divorce law reform. In the case of the states that implemented 
divorce law reforms, although for five breaks it is unclear whether divorce law reforms or the 
Vietnam War led to a change in the divorce rate, for the five states having more than one 
structural break, we observed two changes: one in the 1960s, at the time of the war, and another 
one close to the adoption of the unilateral divorce reform. This finding suggests that permanent 
changes in divorce may have been produced by the reforms of laws regulating how spouses 
obtain a divorce. 
With respect to the negative structural breaks, as mentioned above, those changes are 
grouped in the 1980s and 1990s, in this case, at the time of the custody law changes and the 
main reforms in the laws that try to ensure child support payments. Six of the seven structural 
breaks detected since the 1980s can be associated with the introduction of joint custody, 
although for two of them, Idaho and Texas, the break dates are located one year before of the 
approval of custody reform. For Oregon, another break in the divorce rate occurred in 1983, 
which is hard to relate to the adoption of the joint custody law since it occurs four years 
previously, but it is close to the changes in the CSE program.34  Thus, a decade after the 
unilateral divorce reform, what seems to conduct the behavior of the divorce rates are those 
reforms on the laws that govern the aftermath of divorce which can be associated with negative 
permanent shocks in the divorce rate. 
                                                 
33 The rise in divorce as a result of a war can be permanent if it causes a change in attitudes towards divorce, since a 
greater number of divorces can make that divorce becomes more acceptable. 
34 It is important to note that once the sample is extended to include data from 1950 to 2007, the longest series 
available, in addition to the rise in the number of breaks located in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of those breaks 
that can be related to those changes in the aftermath of divorce also increases. 
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In a final analysis, we look at the divorce rate series of those nonstationary states. 
Although, as said above, it is not possible to speak of a change in the mean, it is comforting that 
the structural breaks located by the Bai and Perron procedure can also be related to the major 
events mentioned in this subsection. First, there is a wave of positive breaks at the time of the 
Vietnam War in almost all states. Then, we found a second positive wave of shocks close to the 
date of the implementation of the unilateral divorce. Finally, the last wave of changes is 
negative, as previously, tallying with the custody law reforms and with the increase in the CSE 
efforts. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper aims to disentangle the effects of reform of laws that govern the aftermath of divorce 
from the effects of unilateral divorce in determining the behavior of U.S. divorce rates. Because 
empirically it is unclear whether the coefficients measuring the response of divorce rates to 
divorce law reforms are only capturing the adjustment path of divorce rates to unilateral divorce 
when it is omitted major reforms that have swept the U.S.A. since the late 1970s, we introduce 
to the analysis of the impact of unilateral divorce two main reforms in the area of post-divorce: 
the adoption of the joint custody regime and the Child Support Enforcement program. 
The incorporation of the custody law change is important since the possibility of joint 
custody may counteract the reassignment of property rights generated by the unilateral divorce, 
according to the Coase theorem. Under joint custody, parents have to collaborate and cooperate 
in decisions affecting the child; this implies a backward step to a situation in which mutual 
consent is necessary. It is not possible to leave out of this analysis the Child Support 
Enforcement program either. The increase in the efforts to try to ensure child support payments 
is relevant in the study of the response of divorce rates to divorce law reforms when less 
restrictive divorce laws are correlated with stricter enforcement efforts made by the states in 
order to achieve the objective of reducing child poverty and welfare costs. 
Our results suggest that the negative evolution of the divorce rate since the 1980s is due 
to law reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce rather than a reverse response of divorce 
rates to the implementation of unilateral divorce laws. However, even after controlling for joint 
custody regime and Child Support Enforcement efforts, it is unclear whether the effect of the 
unilateral divorce reform on divorce rate is transitory or not. Using several techniques, we find 
evidence of both a lasting effect and a permanent effect. All in all, we view our results as 
evidence in favor of the important role of laws that regulate the aftermath of divorce, but we 
also believe that a more thorough examination of the mechanisms through which those reforms 
operate is an interesting question for future research.  
We have also developed a supplemental analysis to explore the frequency of permanent 
shocks in U.S. divorce rates. A clear finding from this analysis is that not all shocks have 
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transitory effects on divorce rates, which is robust to a range of alternative tests. This result can 
be interpreted in the context of evaluating the effects of divorce laws on divorce rates. The 
positive permanent changes in divorce can be associated with the implementation of unilateral 
divorce and the negative permanent changes can be related to the reforms in the laws that 
regulate the aftermath of divorce, again suggesting an important impact of divorce law reforms 
on the evolution of divorce rates. 
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Table 1- WOLFERS’ RESULTS AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS AFTER ADOPTING JOINT 
CUSTODY LAWS 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic specification State-specific State-specific 
Panel A  linear trends quadratic trends 
First 2 years 0.267*** 0.342*** 0.302*** 
 (0.085) (0.062) (0.054) 
Years 3-4 0.210** 0.319*** 0.289*** 
 (0.085) (0.070) (0.065) 
Years 5-6 0.164* 0.300*** 0.291*** 
 (0.085) (0.077) (0.079) 
Years 7-8 0.158* 0.322*** 0.351*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.097) 
Years 9-10 -0.121 0.081 0.161 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.117) 
Years 11-12 -0.324*** -0.102 0.047 
 (0.083) (0.099) (0.142) 
Years 13-14 -0.461*** -0.202* 0.031 
 (0.084) (0.107) (0.167) 
Years 15 -0.507*** -0.210* 0.251 
    Onwards (0.080) (0.119) (0.205) 
Controls    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.975 0.984 
Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
    
Panel B    
First 2 years 0.273*** 0.331*** 0.324*** 
 (0.084) (0.062) (0.054) 
Years 3-4 0.219*** 0.306*** 0.338*** 
 (0.084) (0.070) (0.066) 
Years 5-6 0.174** 0.286*** 0.376*** 
 (0.084) (0.077) (0.082) 
Years 7-8 0.170** 0.310*** 0.480*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.101) 
Years 9-10 -0.088 0.082 0.340*** 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.125) 
Years 11-12 -0.208** -0.062 0.277* 
 (0.084) (0.099) (0.152) 
Years 13-14 -0.321*** -0.168 0.269 
 (0.086) (0.107) (0.181) 
Years 15 -0.298*** -0.176 0.503** 
    Onwards (0.088) (0.120) (0.219) 
Controls    
Years Joint Custody Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.937 0.976 0.985 
Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml Divorce laws coded by Wolfers (2006), see 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by Leo (2008). 
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Table 2- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM  
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic specification State-specific State-specific 
  linear trends quadratic trends 
First 2 years 0.274*** 0.324*** 0.352*** 
 (0.084) (0.062) (0.056) 
Years 3-4 0.221*** 0.296*** 0.387*** 
 (0.085) (0.070) (0.070) 
Years 5-6 0.177** 0.270*** 0.449*** 
 (0.084) (0.077) (0.090) 
Years 7-8 0.174** 0.283*** 0.578*** 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.113) 
Years 9-10 -0.060 0.035 0.457*** 
 (0.093) (0.096) (0.139) 
Years 11-12 -0.277** -0.131 0.468*** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.172) 
Years 13-14 -0.471*** -0.279** 0.511** 
 (0.148) (0.133) (0.211) 
Years 15 -0.246* -0.009 0.918*** 
    Onwards (0.147) (0.139) (0.264) 
Controls    
Years Joint Custody Yes Yes Yes 
Years JC*Years UD Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.937 0.976 0.985 
Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml Divorce laws coded by Wolfers (2006), see 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by Leo (2008). 
 
 
Table 3- CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT VARIABLES 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
    Reforms 
  All Unilateral Divorce Joint Custody UD & JC No Reform 
Collection Rate 15.603 15.008 15.167 16.422 15.505 
 (9.676) (13.742) (7.806) (7.720) (8.200) 
Average Collections 0.137 0.137 0.142 0.126 0.146 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.074) (0.046) (0.171) 
Paternity Rate 0.861 0.564 1.286 0.879 0.865 
 (0.587) (0.561) (0.632) (0.459) (0.559) 
Location Rate 3.567 2.873 4.208 4.582 2.804 
  (2.700) (1.985) (3.290) (3.197) (1.802) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses and population-weighted sample means. CSE data comes from the OCSE 
Annual Reports. 
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Table 4- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE AND CONTROLS FOR CSE 
VARIABLES. 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
    linear trends 
quadratic 
trends   linear trends 
quadratic 
trends 
First 2 years 0.275*** 0.324*** 0.354*** 0.273*** 0.324*** 0.352*** 
 (0.084) (0.062) (0.056) (0.084) (0.062) (0.056) 
Years 3-4 0.224*** 0.295*** 0.391*** 0.220*** 0.295*** 0.387*** 
 (0.084) (0.070) (0.070) (0.085) (0.070) (0.070) 
Years 5-6 0.190** 0.269*** 0.459*** 0.172** 0.268*** 0.449*** 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.090) (0.084) (0.077) (0.090) 
Years 7-8 0.182** 0.281*** 0.588*** 0.175** 0.283*** 0.578*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.113) (0.086) (0.085) (0.113) 
Years 9-10 -0.059 0.034 0.467*** -0.062 0.034 0.457*** 
 (0.093) (0.096) (0.139) (0.093) (0.096) (0.139) 
Years 11-12 -0.290** -0.131 0.475*** -0.278** -0.132 0.467*** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.172) (0.118) (0.113) (0.172) 
Years 13-14 -0.492*** -0.278** 0.512** -0.472*** -0.280** 0.511** 
 (0.148) (0.133) (0.211) (0.148) (0.133) (0.211) 
Years 15 -0.274* -0.008 0.915*** -0.247* -0.009 0.917*** 
    Onwards (0.148) (0.139) (0.264) (0.147) (0.139) (0.264) 
Collection Rate -0.006** 0.000 -0.003*    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    
Average 
Collections    -0.173 -0.074 -0.012 
    (0.186) (0.120) (0.099) 
Years Joint 
Custody Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years JC*Years 
UD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.938 0.976 0.985 0.937 0.976 0.985 
Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml CSE variables are from the OCSE Annual Reports. Divorce laws 
coded by Wolfers (2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by 
Leo (2008). 
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Table 5- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM AND CONTROLS FOR CSE 
VARIABLES BY DIVORCE LAW REGIME 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
    linear trends 
quadratic 
trends   linear trends 
quadratic 
trends 
First 2 years 0.283*** 0.323*** 0.351*** 0.282*** 0.327*** 0.347*** 
 (0.084) (0.061) (0.055) (0.084) (0.062) (0.055) 
Years 3-4 0.246*** 0.303*** 0.387*** 0.245*** 0.315*** 0.386*** 
 (0.085) (0.069) (0.070) (0.085) (0.069) (0.070) 
Years 5-6 0.251*** 0.312*** 0.462*** 0.223*** 0.319*** 0.459*** 
 (0.089) (0.079) (0.090) (0.086) (0.078) (0.090) 
Years 7-8 0.275*** 0.348*** 0.593*** 0.293*** 0.398*** 0.623*** 
 (0.097) (0.090) (0.113) (0.095) (0.088) (0.113) 
Years 9-10 0.063 0.124 0.471*** 0.065 0.163* 0.503*** 
 (0.110) (0.103) (0.140) (0.103) (0.099) (0.139) 
Years 11-12 -0.161 -0.058 0.460*** -0.153 -0.013 0.499*** 
 (0.132) (0.119) (0.172) (0.125) (0.115) (0.171) 
Years 13-14 -0.355** -0.205 0.492** -0.352** -0.171 0.532** 
 (0.161) (0.138) (0.211) (0.152) (0.134) (0.210) 
Years 15 -0.148 0.032 0.874*** -0.143 0.105 0.945*** 
    Onwards (0.159) (0.144) (0.263) (0.152) (0.141) (0.263) 
CSE in states 
with:       
Unilateral Reform -0.010*** -0.004* -0.004** -1.102*** -0.935*** -0.586*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.338) (0.218) (0.181) 
Joint Custody 0.012* 0.024*** 0.010* -0.056 0.264 0.183 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.640) (0.433) (0.362) 
UD & JC -0.016** 0.016*** 0.011** 3.259*** -0.222 -0.191 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (1.039) (0.713) (0.602) 
No Reform -0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.017 0.179 0.165 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.213) (0.137) (0.113) 
Years Joint 
Custody Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years JC*Years 
UD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.938 0.977 0.985 0.938 0.977 0.985 
Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml CSE variables are from the OCSE Annual Reports. Divorce laws 
coded by Wolfers (2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by 
Leo (2008). Columns 1, 2 and 3 include as CSE variable Collection Rate, Columns 4, 5 and 6 include as CSE variable 
Average Collections.  
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Table 6-CORRELATION BETWEEN CSE VARIABLES 
  
Collection 
Rate 
Average 
Collections 
Paternity 
Rate 
Location 
Rate 
Collection Rate 1    
Average Collections -0.0607 1   
Paternity Rate 0.1019 -0.057 1  
Location Rate 0.0704 -0.0327 0.3566 1 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses and population-weighted sample means. CSE data comes from the OCSE 
Annual Reports. 
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Table 7- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM AND CONTROLS FOR ALL 
CSE VARIABLES BY DIVORCE LAW REGIME  
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic State-specific State-specific Cont. Basic State-specific State-specific 
  specification linear trends Quadratic trends  specification linear trends quadratic trends 
First 2 years 0.286*** 0.322*** 0.347*** Paternity Rate in states with:    
 (0.084) (0.061) (0.055) Unilateral Reform 0.186* -0.073 0.119 
Years 3-4 0.258*** 0.318*** 0.386***  (0.105) (0.090) (0.094) 
 (0.085) (0.069) (0.070) Joint Custody 0.055 0.073 0.088 
Years 5-6 0.260*** 0.350*** 0.464***  (0.102) (0.072) (0.066) 
 (0.092) (0.080) (0.090) UD & JC 0.102 -0.339*** 0.018 
Years 7-8 0.321*** 0.454*** 0.614***  (0.113) (0.093) (0.100) 
 (0.106) (0.093) (0.114) No Reform 0.096 0.084 0.050 
Years 9-10 0.084 0.251** 0.476***  (0.094) (0.069) (0.059) 
 (0.123) (0.109) (0.142) Location Rate in states with:    
Years 11-12 -0.114 0.071 0.461*** Unilateral Reform -0.005 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.144) (0.123) (0.173)  (0.027) (0.020) (0.018) 
Years 13-14 -0.335* -0.083 0.484** Joint Custody -0.009 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.178) (0.144) (0.213)  (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
Years 15 -0.243 0.215 0.828*** UD & JC -0.026* 0.015 -0.025* 
    Onwards (0.189) (0.155) (0.267)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Collection Rate in states with:    No Reform 0.005 0.005 0.003 
Unilateral Reform -0.009*** -0.002 -0.003*  (0.026) (0.019) (0.016) 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Years Joint Custody Yes Yes Yes 
Joint Custody 0.012 0.023*** 0.011* Years JC*Years UD Yes Yes Yes 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
UD & JC -0.014** 0.020*** 0.012** State FE Yes Yes Yes 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) State * time No Yes Yes 
No Reform -0.005 0.000 -0.003 State * timesq No No Yes 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)     
Average Collections in states with:        
Unilateral Reform -0.964*** -0.819*** -0.573***     
 (0.350) (0.225) (0.188)     
Joint Custody -0.385 0.244 0.013     
 (0.718) (0.463) (0.397)     
UD & JC 3.346*** 0.354 0.177     
 (1.085) (0.725) (0.627)     
No Reform -0.066 0.164 0.151 Adjusted R2 0.939 0.978 0.985 
  (0.216) (0.138) (0.115) Sample 1956-88, n=1631 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml CSE variables are from the OCSE Annual Reports. Divorce laws 
coded by Wolfers (2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by 
Leo (2008). 
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Table 8- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM. Sample: 1956-1998. 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
Basic 
specification State-specific State-specific 
    linear trends 
quadratic 
trends   linear trends 
quadratic 
trends 
First 2 years 0.274*** 0.399*** 0.294*** 0.281*** 0.316*** 0.295*** 
 (0.096) (0.065) (0.053) (0.094) (0.066) (0.054) 
Years 3-4 0.223** 0.398*** 0.272*** 0.253*** 0.310*** 0.284*** 
 (0.096) (0.071) (0.058) (0.095) (0.073) (0.062) 
Years 5-6 0.180* 0.399*** 0.263*** 0.247** 0.328*** 0.303*** 
 (0.095) (0.076) (0.063) (0.100) (0.082) (0.073) 
Years 7-8 0.179* 0.442*** 0.306*** 0.337*** 0.446*** 0.394*** 
 (0.095) (0.082) (0.068) (0.113) (0.094) (0.086) 
Years 9-10 -0.095 0.215** 0.095 0.121 0.291*** 0.194* 
 (0.094) (0.087) (0.073) (0.127) (0.106) (0.100) 
Years 11-12 -0.302*** 0.065 -0.042 -0.100 0.115 0.084 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.078) (0.149) (0.120) (0.114) 
Years 13-14 -0.445*** -0.018 -0.091 -0.297* -0.042 -0.046 
 (0.092) (0.101) (0.085) (0.178) (0.138) (0.130) 
Years 15 -0.576*** 0.016 0.054 -0.042 0.254* 0.123 
    Onwards (0.061) (0.113) (0.098) (0.171) (0.145) (0.145) 
By Divorce Law 
Regime:       
Collection Rate No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Average Collections No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Paternity Rate No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Location Rate No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls:       
Years Joint Custody No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Years JC*Years UD No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.906 0.966 0.980 0.913 0.969 0.981 
Sample 1956-98, n=2102 state-years 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and population 
weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), see. 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml CSE variables are from the OCSE Annual Reports. Divorce laws 
coded by Wolfers (2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml,  and Joint Custody laws are coded by 
Leo (2008). 
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Table 9- RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS ON DIVORCE RATES 
A: State specific tests1     
Alternative hypothesis   Trend stationary  Trend stationary with one break 
Significance level   % Unit root rejected  % Unit root rejected 
1%  2%  8% 
5%  4%  30% 
10%  8%  48% 
B: Panel tests (p=1)   Balanced panel2  Unbalanced panel3 
    Test-statistic (p-value)  Test-statistic (p-value) 
Levin–Lin–Chu (2002)  -1.109 (0.133)   
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003)  -0.949 (0.171)   
Pesaran (2007)   -5.137 (0.000)  -5.676 (0.000) 
Notes: The null hypothesis is in all cases a unit root in divorce rate. Following the suggestion in Ng and Perron 
(1995) we choose the optimal number of lagged growth rates to be included in the regression to control for 
autocorrelation using a ‘general-to-specific procedure’ based on the t-statistic. The maximum lag length to start off 
this procedure is set at 11. The panel test statistics are the ∗t , the [ ]tW , and the [ ]tZ -statistic in case of the 
Levin–Lin–Chu, Im–Pesaran–Shin and Pesaran test respectively. Panel statistics are based on univariate AR(1) 
specifications including constant. 
1 Excluding Louisiana. 
2 Excluding California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, and West Virginia. 
3 Including all states, except Louisiana. 
Table 10- RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS ON DIVORCE RATES BY STATE, ONE 
STRUCTURAL BREAK TEST. 
State δ  ( )1ˆ −ρ  Structural Break Year 
Alabama 2.15027*** -0.391* 1973 
Alaska 2.90367*** -0.079 1971 
Arizona 1.36532** -0.197 1958 
Arkansas 3.35513*** -0.676*** 1968 
California 1.97197*** -0.208 1966 
Colorado 2.24497*** -0.344 1968 
Connecticut 2.16467*** -0.361 1971 
Delaware 2.91339*** -0.691*** 1970 
District of Columbia 2.47464*** -0.196 1967 
Florida 1.70587*** -0.105 1973 
Georgia 2.81440*** -0.409* 1970 
Hawaii 2.42453*** -0.659** 1968 
Idaho 2.02264*** -0.407* 1970 
Illinois 1.46082*** -0.110 1960 
Indiana 3.10658*** -0.476 1969 
Iowa 1.74796*** -0.463* 1969 
Kansas 2.28588*** -0.316 1971 
Kentucky 2.16189*** -0.264 1976 
Maine 2.15592*** -0.258 1971 
Maryland 1.55846*** -0.351 1969 
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Massachusetts 1.44719*** -0.482* 1969 
Michigan 1.93480*** -0.425** 1969 
Minnesota 1.99516*** -0.477* 1970 
Mississippi 2.40508*** -0.722*** 1970 
Missouri 2.01833*** -0.358 1970 
Montana 1.40091*** -0.211** 1977 
Nebraska 2.02833*** -0.510 1970 
Nevada -12.98665*** -0.217 1972 
New Hampshire 2.59753*** -0.361 1970 
New Jersey 2.27435*** -0.521* 1969 
New Mexico 3.07653*** -0.232 1965 
New York 2.63238*** -0.607** 1970 
North Carolina 2.84530*** -0.564 1971 
North Dakota 2.03803*** -0.474** 1971 
Ohio 2.10924*** -0.274 1971 
Oklahoma 2.03977*** -0.337 1969 
Oregon 1.49943*** -0.146** 1976 
Pennsylvania 1.75424*** -0.536** 1971 
Rhode Island 2.16108*** -0.589 1972 
South Carolina 2.49858*** -0.433** 1972 
South Dakota 2.20330*** -0.446*** 1972 
Tennessee 3.31939*** -0.629 1969 
Texas 1.84297*** -0.149* 1967 
Utah 2.28857*** -0.371** 1968 
Vermont 2.81538*** -0.560** 1970 
Virginia 2.21250*** -0.514 1972 
Washington 2.33676*** -0.295** 1965 
West Virginia 2.64602*** -0.567* 1972 
Wisconsin 1.99106*** -0.444 1972 
Wyoming 2.74816*** -0.287 1968 
Notes: One-break test of Perron and Vogelsang (1992), AO model. ( )1ˆ −ρ : Ho: Unit root, rejected at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level 
Structural Break Year dummy variable coefficient d1: Significant at the ***1% level, **5% level, *10% 
level. 
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Table 11- RESULTS OF MULTIPLE STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
State Mean Divorce Rate Before Break TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 
Alabama 3.94 6.22     
  1971     
Alaska 3.00 4.13 6.07 8.25 6.31 5.10 
  1961 1968 1974 1985 1992 
Arizona 5.17 6.99 5.90    
  1966 1992    
Arkansas 3.11 4.17 6.85    
  1964 1970    
California 3.12 3.86 5.61 4.68   
  1964 1969 1985   
Colorado 3.51 5.74     
  1969     
Connecticut 1.41 3.57     
  1971     
Delaware 1.58 4.55     
  1969     
District of Columbia 1.96 4.49 5.97 3.58   
  1970 1978 1984   
Florida 4.23 5.20 7.04 5.96   
  1965 1971 1987   
Georgia 2.63 5.49     
  1969     
Hawai 2.11 4.53     
  1969     
Idaho 3.94 4.97 6.70 6.12   
  1966 1973 1981   
Illinois 2.28 3.97     
  1968     
Indiana 3.28 6.39     
  1969     
Iowa 1.96 3.69     
  1971     
Kansas 2.56 5.10 4.42    
  1969 1992    
Kentucky 2.36 3.38 4.40 5.67   
  1967 1973 1985   
Maine 2.44 4.72     
  1969     
Maryland 1.85 2.37 3.82 3.36   
  1966 1972 1985   
Massachusetts 1.14 1.80 2.84    
  1964 1971    
Michigan 2.35 4.28     
  1969     
Minnesota 1.45 3.44     
  1970     
Mississippi 2.63 5.04     
  1970     
Missouri 2.82 4.14 5.39 4.95   
  1967 1974 1983   
Montana 3.02 4.77 6.09 5.00   
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  1968 1974 1983   
Nebraska 1.84 3.86     
  1971     
Nevada 25.29 14.94 10.72    
  1962 1980    
New Hampshire 2.01 3.33 5.24 4.68   
  1966 1972 1984   
New Jersey 0.99 2.75 3.58 3.13   
  1971 1977 1991   
New Mexico 3.16 7.56 5.92    
  1970 1986    
New York 0.68 3.28     
  1971     
North Carolina 1.35 2.51 3.85 4.95   
  1964 1971 1977   
North Dakota 1.23 3.26     
  1972     
Ohio 2.53 4.73     
  1969     
Oklahoma 5.18 7.22     
  1969     
Oregon 3.34 4.80 6.55 5.58 4.87  
  1967 1973 1983 1992  
Pennsylvania 1.48 3.22     
  1972     
Rhode Island 1.18 2.28 3.70 3.36   
  1969 1975 1990   
South Carolina 1.43 3.97     
  1971     
South Dakota 1.49 3.69     
  1972     
Tennessee 3.01 6.30     
  1971     
Texas 3.80 4.75 6.29 5.39   
  1967 1973 1986   
Utah 2.03 2.97 4.15 5.15 4.52  
  1961 1968 1974 1992  
Vermont 1.49 3.55 4.60    
  1970 1978    
Virginia 2.10 4.31     
  1972     
Washington 3.68 6.02     
  1968     
West Virginia 2.08 3.45 5.12    
  1968 1974    
Wisconsin 1.43 3.42     
  1972     
Wyoming 3.99 5.63 7.62 6.62   
    1966 1973 1985     
Notes: Columns 3 to 7 include the mean divorce rates following the break, with the break date reported in italics. 
States with a short timespan divorce rate series: CA, IN, KY, LA, NY, WV. Breaks are selected by the repartition 
method from the sequential procedure at the 5 % level with the exception of the states, for which breaks are selected  
by LWZ method: AK, AR, CA, DC, FL, ID, KY, MD, MO, MT, NH, NC, OR, RI, TX, UT, WV, WY. 
 
